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Abstract  27 
During 2011 a large outbreak of typhoid fever affected an estimated 1430 people in Kikwit, 28 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The outbreak started in military camps in the city but then 29 
spread to the general population.  This paper reports the results of an ecological analysis and 30 
a case-control study undertaken to examine water and other possible transmission 31 
pathways.  Attack rates were determined for health areas and risk ratios were estimated 32 
with respect to spatial exposures.  Approximately 15 months after the outbreak, 33 
demographic, environmental and exposure data were collected for 320 cases and 640 34 
controls residing in the worst affected areas, using a structured interview questionnaire.  35 
Unadjusted and adjusted odds ratios were estimated.  Complete data were available for 956 36 
respondents.  Residents of areas with water supplied via gravity on the mains network were 37 
at much greater risk of disease acquisition (risk ratio = 6.20, 95%CI 3.39-11.35) than 38 
residents of areas not supplied by this mains network. In the case control study, typhoid was 39 
found to be associated with ever using tap water from the municipal supply (OR = 4.29, 95% 40 
CI 2.20-8.38).  Visible urine or faeces in the latrine was also associated with increased risk of 41 
typhoid and having chosen a water source because it is protected was negatively associated. 42 
 Knowledge that washing hands can prevent typhoid fever, and stated habit of handwashing 43 
habits before cooking or after toileting was associated with increased risk of disease. 44 
However, observed associations between handwashing or plate-sharing with disease risk 45 
could very likely be due to recall bias.  This outbreak of typhoid fever was strongly associated 46 
with drinking water from the municipal drinking water supply, based on the descriptive and 47 
analytic epidemiology and the finding of high levels of faecal contamination of drinking 48 
water. Future outbreaks of potentially waterborne disease need an integrated response that 49 
includes epidemiology and environmental microbiology during early stages of the outbreak.   50 
  51 
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Author summary 52 
 53 
There was a large outbreak of typhoid fever in Kikwit, DRC, in late 2011.  The outbreak 54 
started in military camps in the city but then spread to the general population.  Multiple 55 
investigations were undertaken to understand how the disease spread.  The worst affected 56 
areas of the city were mapped and compared to the water network.  In early 2013, 57 
demographic and exposure data were collected for 320 cases and 640 controls residing in 58 
the worst affected areas, using a structured interview questionnaire to try to better 59 
understand individual risk factors.  Residents of areas with water supplied via a gravity fed 60 
network were about six times more likely to have been ill with typhoid fever than residents 61 
of areas not supplied by the mains network. The most important individual risk factor was 62 
ever using tap water.  Visible urine or faeces increased risk of getting typhoid but having 63 
chosen a water source because it is protected was linked to lower risk.   Not handwashing 64 
and regularly sharing plates of food were also linked to less illness, but these findings may be 65 
especially subject to recall bias.  The water network was also found to be heavily 66 
contaminated, including with faecal bacteria of human origin in multiple microbiological 67 
studies.  Spatial, microbiological and case-control studies all implicate the water supplies in 68 
Kikwit to be unsafe and linked to spread of typhoid fever in 2011.  Improvements to the 69 
mains water network in Kikwit are urgently needed to prevent future typhoid fever 70 
outbreaks.  71 
 72 
73 
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Introduction 74 
Typhoid fever (TF) is an infection caused by the bacterium Salmonella enterica 75 
serovar typhi (S. Typhi).  The primary symptoms are fever and related malaise, but serious 76 
complications, such as intestinal haemorrhage or perforation (1-4% of all cases [1]), 77 
encephalitis, respiratory infections and metastatic abscesses can occur.  In the absence of 78 
treatment, there is a case fatality rate of 10-30%, which drops to ~1% with timely treatment 79 
[2].  Data from 2010-2013  suggested that the TF disease burden in Africa was 4.3 million 80 
cases per year (95%CI 3.7 – 5.1 million) [3].   Data to estimate the total case fatality rate in 81 
sub-Saharan Africa are unreliable [1,3].  The mean case-fatality rate after S. Typhi caused by 82 
intestinal perforation has been reported at 19.5% (95%CI 16-22%) in African countries [4]. 83 
Typhoid is a strictly human infection and spreads from one person to another 84 
especially through faecal oral or urine oral pathways   including consumption of 85 
contaminated food or water.  Spread is exacerbated by poor sanitation and hygiene. 86 
Outbreaks have regularly been reported, but those occurring in low income countries are 87 
not well researched. Instead, most studies have described outbreaks in industrialized 88 
settings [2].  Consequently, opportunities to reduce transmission in these low-resource 89 
settings may not be identified or properly understood.   90 
Repeated and sometimes severe outbreaks of typhoid have occurred in the 91 
Democratic Republic of Congo [5]. After a large outbreak of typhoid in the city of Kikwit, 92 
Bandundu Province, in the year 2006, typhoid became endemic, with low but persistent 93 
numbers of cases reported annually until another large outbreak in November 2011 to early 94 
January 2012.  The 2011-2012 event resulted in 1430 identified cases.   Seventy-one people 95 
developed peritonitis with perforation, and 17 people died in 2011-2012.  The fatality rate 96 
was 1.5% [6].  An initial descriptive epidemiological study recognised that contaminated 97 
water supplies were likely responsible for most cases in 2011 [6], but did not elucidate on 98 
transmission pathways or other risk factors for infection in the subsequent phases of the 99 
outbreak.  Patients in the 2006 and 2011 outbreaks appeared to come from the same areas 100 
of the city, which led to suspicions that an infrastructure problem or spatial feature might 101 
contribute to the risk of catching TF (S1 Protocol).  It was observed that 2011 attack rates 102 
were highest in military camps within the city, especially early in the outbreak.  The 103 
descriptive evidence suggested that the 2011 outbreak originated in the camps and 104 
subsequently spread to the general population.  Here, we provide a quantitative 105 
investigation of exposure factors linked to infection in 2011, accompanied with 106 
recommendations both for prevention and during emergency response. 107 
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Methods 108 
We undertook both an ecological analysis and a case-control study in order to better 109 
understand the primary transmission pathways of the epidemic and determine whether we 110 
could identify other risk factors.  Based on the descriptive epidemiology and general 111 
knowledge of the epidemiology of typhoid, our primary hypotheses were 1) that the 112 
outbreak was waterborne and/or 2) that the infection spread directly from person to 113 
person.   114 
 115 
 116 
Study setting  117 
 Kikwit is the largest city in the Bandundu province of DRC.  The estimated population 118 
in 2011 was 400,000 (Fig. 1).  Kikwit is located in the south-west of DRC and is an important 119 
commercial and administrative centre.  In 2011, the city had one general referral hospital 120 
and was administratively divided into two health zones, north and south. Each health zone 121 
(“Zone de Santé”) was divided into health areas (“Aires de Santé”). There were 19 and 22 122 
health areas respectively in north and south Kikwit at the time of the study. At the time of 123 
the outbreak, there were three military camps in the city, which accommodated about 2400 124 
people: staff and families. Ngubu camp and Nsinga camp were in close proximity to the 125 
general population, while Ebeya camp was relatively separate from the city. The camp 126 
residents could be considered a highly mobile population and are mostly not of local origin.  127 
They had living conditions distinct from and mostly worse than the city’s settled residents. 128 
The military staff and families originate from many regions of DRC and speak many 129 
languages. Overall, living conditions in the three camps were poor and featured relatively 130 
high population density and poor hygiene and sanitation conditions. As a result, this study 131 
treated the three camps as three additional health areas which were analysed 132 
independently of the Aire de Santé where they were situated [6]. 133 
 134 
Fig. 1: Household density map of Kikwit city, DRC, using homogenous areas visually classified as having 135 
high, medium or low housing density based on recent high-resolution satellite imagery. 136 
 137 
 Kikwit is a hilly city with sandy soils and large erosion gullies.  The city has a long wet 138 
season with an average of about 200mm of rain per month, from early September through 139 
end May.  The city has centrally collected and distributed piped water, which is extracted 140 
from artesian wells, inconsistently chlorinated (S1 Report) and distributed via an aging pipe 141 
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network to community tap points (standpipes, Fig. 2).  Water pressure is usually low 142 
throughout the network.  Mains water is relatively expensive and difficult to access in parts 143 
of the city (S1 Report).  Some homes have access to private wells.  Surface water sources are 144 
widely available and generally free-of-charge. Surface sources are the river Kwilu, its 145 
tributaries, as well as protected and unprotected springs.  No changes to the water 146 
infrastructure occurred in the time that elapsed between the 2011 outbreak and the survey 147 
dates.  148 
 Sanitation in the city is privately managed.  Latrines are typically dug out by hand, 149 
and often are open air (no roof) and shared among multiple households.  After a latrine fills 150 
up it is typically covered with thin soil, a mango tree is planted and a replacement latrine is 151 
dug nearby.  Flooding of human waste out of active latrines is not unusual following 152 
significant rainfall events. 153 
 154 
Fig. 2: Drinking water network and sources in Kikwit, 2011-2013. 155 
 156 
Ecological analysis 157 
Study design and protocol for the spatial analysis is in S1 Protocol.  During the 2011 158 
typhoid outbreak, The Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) created a central register line list of 159 
all cases, both suspected and confirmed.  The case definitions were set by the Ministry of 160 
Public Health (MOPH); “suspected case” was any person with fever ≥ 38°C for more than 161 
three days and digestive disorders, which were defined as diarrhoea, constipation or 162 
abdominal pain, as well as a negative malaria test. A “confirmed case” was a suspected case 163 
confirmed by isolation of S. Typhi from blood, bone marrow or duodenal fluid.  The outbreak 164 
was confirmed by the MOPH based on the results of cultures of 50 blood and stool samples, 165 
which were tested in the University Hospital in Kinshasa.  From the start of the outbreak, all 166 
TF cases had their data entered into a central electronic line list developed by the MOPH.  167 
The register included patient’s name, sex, age and address.  By the end of the outbreak, the 168 
line register had 1430 cases, with illness onset dates from 19 Nov 2011 to 5 January 2012.  169 
The attack rate for each of the 41 health areas and three military camps was determined 170 
using the central register line list and estimated 2011 population data.  Environmental 171 
elements were mapped [7] in early-mid 2013 for each health area in Kikwit using ArcGIS 172 
software (ESRI, California, USA).  Spatial attributes were assigned to an entire health area as 173 
the predominate trait for that health area. A key environmental item of interest was the 174 
predominant water distribution network that public water taps connected to in each area. 175 
The network options were: northern pump, central pump, central gravity or off network.  176 
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Other spatial attributes for each health area were population density the (average) distances 177 
from each health area to the nearest camp, market, school, springs, tarred road, water point 178 
or health care clinic. Distances to these locations were of interest because these places tend 179 
to be places where people cluster and thus might pass on infection.  Data on socio-economic 180 
status, sanitation statistics or water quality (such as via the WHO Joint Monitoring 181 
Programme) were unavailable at the scale of health areas. Incident risk ratios were 182 
estimated for each health area using negative binomial regression, testing for any 183 
association between single or multiple exposures to environmental attributes in the health 184 
area and attack rate. The outcome was set to be the number of cases within each health 185 
area, the model offset was the (natural log transformation of the) total population in that 186 
same area.  Distances were modelled continuously under a Poisson functional form.  187 
Categories were also available that described the water source in each health area (gravity 188 
or pumped, north or central, see data in S1 Spreadsheet). 189 
 190 
 191 
Case-control study 192 
 Study design and protocol is item S2 Protocol. The case-control study focused on 193 
individual risk factors.  The data were collected using structured household interviews 194 
between February and May 2013. Descriptive results of the data collected about cases 195 
during these interviews are described elsewhere [6].   Aspects of the structured survey as 196 
reported previously will be briefly recapped here. 197 
The survey was targeted at cases and controls living in the Aires de Santé with the 198 
highest attack rates during the outbreak. The case-control study was done in only these 199 
areas primarily for logistical reasons.  The attack rate for each health area was estimated 200 
using the denominator from population census data. For the case control study, we 201 
surveyed residents in the eight most affected health areas (attack rates > 0.36%) while also 202 
separating out and interviewing residents of the three military camps, because the camps all 203 
had AR > 4% (Fig. 3).   204 
 205 
Fig. 3: The health areas of Kikwit city, DRC, with low (<0.05%), intermediate (0.05% to 0.36%) or high 206 
(>0.36%) total attack rates during the 2011 typhoid fever outbreak as well as the city’s military camps 207 
(labelled with name), markets, principal roads and points where water was tested.  208 
 209 
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 To identify an odds ratio of at least 1.5 with a power of 80% for risk factors present in 210 
30% of the control population, a sample size was set at 320 cases (25% of total), frequency 211 
matched by age and sex to 640 controls.   212 
 A structured questionnaire was developed and piloted (S1 Questionnaire). Twelve 213 
interviewers and one supervisor who spoke local languages were trained to verbally 214 
administer the questionnaire.  Interviewers exercised own judgement in how to translate the 215 
questionnaire from French into other languages, when required.  The interviewers were 216 
trained how to record household location and its principal water source using GPS devices 217 
(Garmin GPSMAP 76).  Using the recorded addresses in the line list records, typhoid cases 218 
(from the concurrent case definition) were chosen at random, using random numbers 219 
generated in MS Excel.  Cases were traced and then interviewed in the community.   Serology 220 
was not used to confirm recovered case status. 221 
 Two controls of the same sex, age class of 5 years interval (0-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 222 
etc.) and health area were selected per case. Selection criterion for each control was not 223 
having been suspected of typhoid during the outbreak period.  After interviewing a case, 224 
interviewers decided which end of their road to treat as the starting point, and then chose 225 
two control households by rolling a die to select the nth residences (alternating between left 226 
and right side of the street).  Posited controls were asked if they had TF or were ill during the 227 
TF outbreak.  Those who reported having TF or being ill were excluded as was their entire 228 
household (assumed to share same latrine and water supply).  The die was rolled again if 229 
necessary to select a different household for a potential control.  A maximum of one person 230 
was interviewed per household.  All respondents were requested to show their household 231 
water storage containers, available soap and latrines. For children less than 13 years old, the 232 
interview was conducted with the guardian or a family member who was living in the same 233 
household and aware of the child’s condition.   234 
 During the household survey, level of awareness about the 2011-12 outbreak was very 235 
high and people claimed to be able to remember with accuracy if they had been ill during that 236 
period.  Interviewers were welcome in people’s homes as representatives of MSF. No one 237 
refused to be interviewed. 238 
  All GPS readings were recorded and visualized using ArcGIS software (ESRI, California, 239 
USA).  Conditional logistic regression (clogit) for risk factors were undertaken using STATA 240 
version 14.2, with data grouped by health area.  Odds ratios (OR) for most risk factors were 241 
first estimated in single predictor models.  Exposures and factors were excluded from 242 
univariate analysis if < 5% of responses were different from the most popular answer to a 243 
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specific question. Any individual variable p-value <0.20 was carried forward into a multiple 244 
predictor case-control analysis.   We endeavoured to keep all categories in the model if a 245 
variable had multiple levels.  However, some variables were trialled by recoding them into 246 
binary variables where exploratory analysis found a strong association (such as having any tap 247 
water, as primary or secondary source or outside the home).  Otherwise, risk factors were 248 
retained in iterative modelling as long as they had p-value < 0.05 to produce the final 249 
estimated adjusted odds ratios reported here.   For purely categorical items, the reference 250 
value was set at the value with greatest frequency; for ordinal items, the reference value was 251 
set at the lowest rank answer.  Using adjusted ORs and the fraction of cases receiving an 252 
exposure, the population attributable risk  [8] percentage was determined for key predictors 253 
in the final model. Where few data were missing, those specific observations were excluded 254 
in the final model; where many data were missing, the variable was not used in multivariate 255 
analysis. 256 
 257 
Water quality testing  258 
Study design and protocol for the water quality analysis is within S2 Protocol.  Water 259 
samples of the principal source of drinking water of all interviewed cases were collected by 260 
two trained water and sanitation community workers, on 18 distinct dates from 13.3.2013 to 261 
10.4.2013. Replicate tests were done on water samples onsite for Free Residual Chlorine 262 
(FRC) levels using the HANNA Photometer.  Concentrations of ThermoTolerant Coliforms 263 
(TTC) were measured using a Delagua field kit.  Tests for S. Typhi specifically were not 264 
undertaken – they seemed inappropriate so long (16 months) after the outbreak.  A 265 
pathogen-specific test (such as PCR for S. Typhi) also exceeded our research budget and 266 
required equipment or laboratory facilities (for molecular biology) not available locally.  In 267 
contrast, tests for TTC were useful to indicate likelihood of ongoing faecal contamination 268 
problems.   Further details of the testing regime and results, including verification strategies, 269 
are in Ali et al [6].  The water quality data were used to calculate what proportion of water 270 
samples from each source could be considered high or low risk for transmission of human 271 
disease, using categories adapted from UNHCR guidelines [9].    272 
 273 
Protocol deviations 274 
Members of the research team changed.  The procedure for selecting controls as described 275 
in the protocol was not used; a different set of procedures for selecting controls was 276 
devised, as described previously.  The minimum age of independent respondents was 277 
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changed from ten to 13 years old. Although specified in the protocol, the final study did not 278 
assess risk factors for disease severity (as indicated by peritonitis or intestinal perforation).  279 
No analysis of the 2006 outbreak was undertaken.  Area-level education and income data 280 
were not suitable or available, so not used in the ecological analysis.  Data collection dates 281 
were three months later than anticipated.  The protocol also contains some factual errors 282 
because it was written prior to data collection, such as stating there were 33 Aires de Santé 283 
in Kikwit (actually there were 41, not 33), while the estimated population total was 284 
misstated to be 350,000; actual population turned out to be higher.  The number of water 285 
quality tests per source was 1-4 (most often but not always 2).  In the case-control study, we 286 
decided to focus on the eight most affected Aires de Santé, not the seven most affected 287 
areas as stated in the protocol.  We don’t believe that any of these deviations or factual 288 
errors undermine our results or conclusions.  289 
 290 
 291 
Ethics 292 
Ethics approval was received from the Ethical committee of the School of Public 293 
Health, University of Kinshasa (DRC) and Ministry of Higher Education, Academic and 294 
Scientific Research. Written informed consent was sought and obtained for all respondents 295 
or from their caretakers/guardians (children under 18). 296 
 297 
 298 
Results 299 
 300 
Ecological analysis 301 
None of the spatial attributes could be linked with statistical significance (p < 0.05 302 
for risk ratio) to the 2011 TF attack rate at health area level, except for water source.  Table 303 
1 shows findings (see supporting data in S1 Spreadsheet), which reports risk ratios and 304 
attack rates for residents dependent on given water sources (p < 0.001).  Residents who 305 
were dependent on the central gravity system were five times more at risk compared to 306 
residents on the northern (pumped) network (RR=6.20 vs. 1.21), and about three times 307 
more at risk compared to those on the central pump system (RR=6.20 vs. 2.25).     308 
 309 
 310 
Table 1. Attack rates and Risk Ratios related to exposure to Kikwit water supplies 311 
 312 
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Water Supply Attack Rate/1000 (95%CI) Risk Ratio (95% CI) 
No mains water standpipes 9.73 (8.1-11.6) 1.00 (reference) 
Central gravity system 55.94 (52.0-60.1) 6.20 (3.39-11.35) 
Central pump system 21.8 (18.9-25.1) 2.25 (1.14-4.45) 
Northern (pump) system 13.7 (11.1-16.7) 1.21 (0.59-2.49) 
 313 
 314 
 315 
 316 
Case-control study 317 
Data on occupational status of the head of household, demographic, sanitation and 318 
water quality traits identified for camp and city populations are described in greater detail in 319 
Ali et al [6].  Refer to the original survey questionnaire (S1 Questionnaire) and survey data, 320 
both raw and derived variables, (S2 Spreadsheet) for more details.  Out of the 320 cases 321 
interviewed, 59 (18%) lived in the camps.  Although the heads of households in the camps 322 
had more secure employment (75% in camps vs. 25% in town had work contracts), the city 323 
dwellers were more affluent, as indicated by greater access to electricity or a functioning TV.  324 
Sharing latrines with other families is normal practice in Kikwit for both military and civilian 325 
families.  None of the observed latrines of the cases in camps and only 3% of cases in the 326 
general population had materials to facilitate wash hands (eg., soap and water) at a close 327 
distance (< 3 metres) from latrines. Upon request, 66% and 82% of cases in camps and 328 
general population showed the available soap in the household.  This suggests that although 329 
respondents often said they washed their hands, many were in fact only rinsing their hands.  330 
Age and education profiles were similar for both military and civilian families, but 331 
households in the camps were more likely (77%) to live in a house of brick or concrete 332 
construction; most non-brick homes were made from mud.  Controls were 2:1 frequency 333 
matched by age and sex to the recruited 320 cases. 334 
The unadjusted odds ratios (OR) comparing cases and controls for individual risk 335 
factors are in Table 2.  The OR in Table 2 used the factors as coded in the original survey (S1 336 
Questionnaire and S2 Spreadsheet), although some survey elements were excluded for 337 
reasons described in the Methods, and for brevity, not all univariate results are listed in the 338 
table.  Age and sex associations with case status are shown to be insignificant in Table 2, 339 
which indicates that frequency matching was successfully implemented.   Seventeen 340 
possible predictive factors had odds ratios with p-values ≥ 0.20 in single variate analysis.  341 
Twenty factors were taken forward to be tried in multivariate estimations of OR (because 342 
they had p < 0.20).  Some hygiene, cooking customs, and indicators of socio-economic status 343 
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were among the risk factors that qualified for trial in multivariate OR estimations.  At the 344 
single variate stage, intake of any tap water (OR 3.41, 95%CI 1.88-6.19), whether tap water 345 
was a primary or secondary source (OR 2.80, 95%CI 1.64-4.79), knowledge to wash hands 346 
(OR 2.36, 95%CI 1.45-3.86), assertions that they know how to avoid typhoid (OR 0.44, 95%CI 347 
0.31-0.61), and statement of habitual washing of hands before cooking (OR 5.12, 95%CI 348 
3.11-8.44) had the strongest association with increased disease.  Those who said that they 349 
regularly shared their plates of food had reduced risk.  All indicators suggestive of better 350 
handwashing behaviour (more frequent handwashing or knowledge that handwashing 351 
should reduce disease transmission), were positively associated with typhoid case status 352 
(see data in Table 2).  Aspects of the home environment (topography and home construction 353 
materials) as well as habits of eating uncooked food were also significant enough to be 354 
trialled in multivariate modelling.  The number of water storage containers in the household 355 
or claiming to have soap in the home did not reach the threshold to be tried in multivariate 356 
analysis. 357 
  358 
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Table 2. Unadjusted odds ratios (with 95% CI) for case status = recorded case of typhoid 359 
fever, for responses collected using S1 Questionnaire. Response data for case-control study 360 
are available in S2 Spreadsheet.   361 
 362 
Risk factor individual matched OR 
(95% CI) 
 Risk factor Individual matched OR 
(95% CI) 
Odds ratios with p-value ≥ 0.20 
Kitchen is tiled 2.93 (0.63-13.63)  Respondent is literate 0.97 (0.57-1.66) 
Household has 
functional electricity? 0.93 (0.68-1.28) 
 Household has a 
functional radio? 0.93 (0.71-1.24) 
(females only) Did 
they live here in 
November 2011? 
0.83 (0.52-1.32) 
 Main water storage 
vessel is covered 1.05 (0.75-1.46) 
Stage of hygiene in 
household is 
reasonable 
1.04 (0.79-1.37) 
 Stated there is soap in 
the house today 1.21 (0.78-1.87) 
Number of water 
storage containers in 
household 
 
1.02 (0.97-1.08) 
 Household has a 
functional TV 0.92 (0.68-1.24) 
Number of persons in 
household 1.06 (1.00-1.10) 
 They said to treat 
water to avoid TF 0.94 (0.62-1.42) 
   They said to use 
latrines to avoid TF 0.99  (0.71-1.37) 
Do they eat raw fruit or vegetables?    
Never 1.0 (reference, n = 866)  What type is most used latrine? 
Sometimes 1.06 (0.63-1.79)  Pit 1.0 (reference, n=912) 
Regularly 0.0001 (not estimable)  Improved 3.85 (0.36-44.23) 
   Flush 0.62 (0.24-1.62) 
Education levels (some or complete)  Flush and septic 1.54 (0.55-4.26) 
Primary 1.0 (reference, n = 87)    
Secondary 0.93 (0.58-1.49)  Number of households using main latrine 
Tertiary 0.74 (0.42-1.31)  1  1.0 (reference) n = 495 
   2-4 1.18 (0.88-1.58) 
Male sex 1.03 (0.78-1.35)  5-7 0.83 (0.34-2.03) 
Age 1.00 (0.99-1.01)  7+ 0.59 (0.19-1.82) 
     
Odds ratios with p-value < 0.20 
Respondent ever 
intakes tap water 
(primary, secondary 
source at home, or 
away from home)? 
3.41 (1.88-6.19) 
 Principle water source 
chosen because it is 
protected 0.78 (0.58-1.05) 
They say they know 
how to avoid TF 0.44 (0.31-0.61) 
 Tap water is a primary 
or secondary source of 
household water 
2.80 (1.64-4.79) 
They say wash hands 
to avoid TF 2.36 (1.45-3.86) 
 Household has a 
functional mobile 
phone 
0.71 (0.46-1.09) 
   Visible urine and/or 
faeces in latrine area 1.24 (0.94-1.65) 
Do they eat uncooked food?    
Never 1.0 (reference, n = 694)  Do they share their plate with others? 
Sometimes 1.26 (0.91-1.73)  Never 1.0 (reference, n = 138) 
Regularly 0.12 (0.04-0.39)  Sometimes 0.98 (0.66-1.45) 
   Regularly 0.08 (0.04-0.16) 
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Do they wash hands after defecation?    
Never 1.0 (reference, n=69)  What time of day do they collect water? 
Sometimes 1.48 (0.81-2.69)  Morning 1.0 (reference, n = 915) 
Always 2.18 (1.19-4.00)  Midday 1.56 (0.65-3.74) 
   Evening 2.53 (1.04-6.18) 
Do they wash hands after childcare?    
Never 1.0 (reference, n = 70)  What is the primary household water source? 
Sometimes 3.16 (1.64-6.11)  Tap  1.0 (reference, n = 754) 
Always 3.24 (1.63-6.45)  Protected spring 0.13 (0.04-0.37) 
   Unprotected spring 0.26 (0.09-0.71) 
Do they wash hands before cooking?  Well 0.49 (0.10-2.34) 
Never 1.0 (reference, n = 191)    
Sometimes 3.21 (2.00-5.16)   
Always 5.12 (3.11-8.44)    
     
Item shown when asked “Can you show me your soap?”  
Nothing 0.97 (0.59-1.61)    
Laundry detergent 0.49 (0.35-0.70)    
Hand soap new in 
pack 
0.69 (0.33-1.44)   
Topography of residence 
Used hand soap 1.0 (reference, n = 412)  Hilltop 1.0 (reference, n = 620) 
   On a slope 0.65 (0.46-0.91) 
What level of education did they attain?  In a dip 0.37 (0.18-0.78) 
Some primary 1.0 (reference, n = 62)    
Finished primary 1.00 (0.38-2.64)    
Some secondary 0.77 (0.43-1.36)  What is their primary source for drinking water? 
Finished secondary 1.16 (0.66-2.06)  Tap  1.0 (reference, n = 750) 
Some tertiary 1.67 (0.72-3.86)  Protected spring 0.10 (0.04-0.29) 
Finished tertiary 0.53 (0.27-1.07)  Unprotected spring 0.57 (0.23-1.41) 
   Well 0.59 (0.14-2.37) 
   
What materials is their home made of?    
Unconsolidated mud 1.0 (reference, n = 121)  
Consolidated mud 0.90 (0.58-1.39)  
Loose bricks 1.67 (0.76-3.69)  
Consolidated bricks or multilevel 1.48 (0.93-2.36)  
   
Occupation of head of household:   
Casual labourer 1.65 (1.15-2.39)  
Labourer with regular contract 1.0 (reference, n = 380)  
Own business 2.31 (1.54-3.46)  
Farmer 1.78 (0.86-3.70)  
Other 2.92 (1.87-4.56)  
   
 363 
Notes: TF = Typhoid fever.  For brevity, not all univariate calculations are shown.  OR were 364 
not calculated for variables where < 5% of answers were different from the most popular 365 
answer. 366 
 367 
  368 
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 369 
In all cases (OR data in Table 2), those who stated that they always wash hands after 370 
defecation or before cooking and before infant care had significantly increased risk of 371 
disease. Those who stated never in response to these questions, had strongly decreased risk.  372 
Knowledge about handwashing was similarly correlated; those who said they knew they 373 
should wash hands had much increased risk.  Explanations for this unexpected finding are 374 
explored in the Discussion. 375 
To put multiple variables about washing hands behaviour or beliefs into the same 376 
model could create collinearity problems.  Moreover, the information about washing hands 377 
before cooking or after childcare is incomplete because this question was only asked to 378 
female heads of household, and hence there were missing data for 253 respondents.  379 
Similarly, answers were missing for 264 respondents (56 cases and 208 controls), on 380 
whether they mentioned washing hands when asked about ways to avoid catching TF.  381 
However, there were no missing data about washing hands after defecation for any 382 
respondent.  To minimise collinearity and for ease of interpretation, only the variable about 383 
handwashing habits after defecation was used to indicate handwashing knowledge or 384 
behaviour, when generating the final model.   385 
Table 3 shows our final predictive model with all final significant predictors with 386 
adjusted odds ratios.  Complete data were available for 320 cases and 636 controls.  This 387 
model adjusts for age and sex for completeness, but their coefficients are not shown 388 
because their distribution was artificially imposed by the control recruitment method and 389 
therefore cannot be interpreted as risk indicators.  Regularly sharing food was also linked to 390 
less illness (adj. OR 0.07, 95%CI 0.03-0.14).  Contaminated mains water (adj. OR 4.25, 95%CI 391 
2.18-8.28) was likely to be an important route for typhoid transmission in this population, 392 
either via direct ingestion or additional exposure (hand washing habits).  The population 393 
attributable risk percentage (PAR%) for tap water consumption was estimated at 69.6%.  394 
Choosing a water source for perceived protected status seemed to confer reduced risk (adj. 395 
OR 0.68, 95%CI 0.48-0.95), while the indicator of visible urine/faeces in the respondent’s 396 
primary latrine area conferred increased risk of disease acquisition (adj. OR 1.43, 95%CI 397 
1.05-1.95; PAR% = 17.3%).  Other PAR values are reported in Table 3, although not for 398 
exposures that reduced risk – the PAR was not developed for that purpose. 399 
 400 
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 401 
Table 3.   Adjusted odds ratios in typhoid fever outbreak, Kikwit DRC 2011. 402 
 403 
     Risk factor Case  
n (%) 
Control  
n (%) 
Odds 
ratio 
OR 95% CI p PAR 
Plate sharing       
Never    56 (5.9)   82 (8.6) 1.0 (ref)  0.000  
Sometimes 254 (26.6) 388 (40.6) 1.29 0.84-1.98   --- 
Regularly   10 (1.0) 166 (17.4) 0.07 0.03-0.14   --- 
       
Occupation of head of household     
Casual labourer 86 (9.0) 169 (17.7) 2.12 1.41-3.17  14.1% 
Labourer reg. contract 95 (9.9) 283 (29.6) 1.0 (ref)  0.000  
Own business 67 (7.0)   94 (9.8) 2.61 1.68-4.07  12.9% 
Farmer 13 (1.4)   24 (2.5) 2.74 1.22-6.15    2.6% 
Other 59 (6.2)   66 (6.9) 3.86 2.36-6.32  13.6% 
       
Tap water is ever 
used 
      
No   29 (3.0) 107 (11.2) 1.0 (ref)  0.000  
Yes 291 (30.4) 529 (55.3) 4.29 2.20-8.38  69.6% 
       
Wash hands after defecating      
Never   16 (1.7)   52 (5.4) 1.0 (ref)  0.000  
Sometimes 139 (14.5) 316 (33.0) 1.27 0.67-2.43    9.0% 
Always 165 (17.3) 268 (28.0) 2.71 1.40-5.28  32.2% 
       
Water source chosen because it is protected    
No 224 (23.4) 413 (43.2) 1.0 (ref)  0.028  
Yes 
 
  96 (10.0) 223 (23.3) 0.68 0.49-0.96  --- 
Visible urine/faeces at 
latrine 
      
No 136 (14.2) 302 (31.6) 1.0 (ref)  0.022  
Yes 184 (19.2) 334 (34.9) 1.44 1.06-1.97  17.3% 
   404 
Notes: Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression used to estimate adjusted odds ratios.  405 
PAR = population-attributable risk.  See text for model interpretation and variable coding.  406 
Other model metrics: 956 observations, Log likelihood = -490.13, LR χ2 = 187.91 (p = 0.000), 407 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1609. 408 
 409 
410 
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+- 411 
 Sources of drinking water  412 
According to the survey responses, the majority (90%) of cases in the general (not 413 
camp) population used taps at communal distribution points as their principal source of 414 
drinking water.  Water sources for camp residents were more diverse. The most common 415 
sources of drinking water for cases in each camp were (Table 4): an artesian well for Ngubu 416 
camp (36%), taps at communal distribution points for Nsinga camp (34%), and an 417 
unprotected source for Ebeya camp (30%).  Overall, 34% of all camp cases used communal 418 
taps as their principal source of drinking water.   419 
 420 
Table 4. Epidemiological and water quality data of the three military camps in 421 
Kikwit, DRC, 2013. 422 
   423 
Camp 2011 
Population 
Total 
cases 
Attack 
rate % 
Main water source TTC (CFU 
100ml-1) 
Ebeya 931 65 6.98 Unprotected spring 101-1000 
Nsinga 681 40 5.87 Public water tap 101-1000 
Ngubu 768 37 4.82 Artesian borehole 0 
 424 
Notes: TTC= Thermotolerant coliform colonies, CFU=colony forming units.   425 
 426 
 427 
 Almost all the sources of tested principal drinking water were contaminated with 428 
faecal coliforms to a very high degree (see S3 Spreadsheet for original data).  Free residual 429 
chlorine levels measured at the public water taps were insufficient (<0.2 mg.l-1) to zero [6]. 430 
Figure 4 indicates the main types of water source tested and the proportion of each type of 431 
each source that fell into risk categories to human health.  There were 102 unique sources 432 
identified by interviewees. Protected springs were most likely to be low risk.  Only one of the 433 
water taps conformed to published standards.   Most respondents (892/960, 92.9%) who 434 
were asked about possible treatment methods did not report that they treated their water 435 
by chlorination, boiling or filtration (or another pathogen inactivation method); therefore, 436 
we did not include water treatment factors when estimating odds ratios and exposures. 437 
 438 
Fig. 4: Health risks of water points in Kikwit, DRC, based on thermotolerant coliform colony 439 
(TCC) counts: 0 CFU.100ml-1 (Minimal risk, according to concurrent UNHCR water pollution 440 
guidelines [9]): 1-10 CFU.100ml-1 (low risk), 11-100 CFU.100ml-1 (intermediate risk), 101-1000 441 
CFU.100ml-1 (high risk) and >1000 CFU.100ml-1 (very high risk).  442 
  443 
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Discussion 444 
Multiple lines of investigation tied together here establish a strong association of 445 
mains water with the spread of the outbreak from the camps to the rest of the population, 446 
conforming with the multi-level evidence recommendations for surveillance of waterborne 447 
infectious diseases made by Tillett et al.  [10].  The ecological study strongly suggested that 448 
the outbreak was linked to particular parts of the city water supply and showed that attack 449 
rates for city residents were highest in the areas with a gravity-fed mains water distribution. 450 
The case-control study confirmed that using mains water was most strongly and reliably 451 
associated with the risk of disease acquisition.  Descriptive epidemiological analysis found 452 
that attack rates peaked earliest and were highest overall in the military camps [6].  The 453 
outbreak appears to have started in the camps, likely due to more naïve population and 454 
poorer living conditions, where a diversity of water sources were used, as shown in this 455 
report.  Microbiological analysis has repeatedly shown drinking water sources throughout 456 
Kikwit to be mostly unsafe, due to high faecal coliform counts and inadequate chlorination 457 
[6,11].  Ingress of faecal material during the outbreak period, due to low water pressure, was 458 
very plausible to expect in many parts of the network concurrently observed to be in poor 459 
repair (S1 Report). In 2011, the outdated mains water supply system in Kikwit probably 460 
played an important role in disseminating typhoid from early cases in camps to the general 461 
population.   462 
This case-control study also adds to the descriptive epidemiology report, the 463 
information that statements by respondents about regular handwashing were linked to 464 
increased risk of disease.  Handwashing with soap after toileting or prior to food preparation 465 
and after infant care, should be best practice in all settings including where endemic 466 
diseases are present, but this may not be true when the main water sources available for 467 
washing are themselves contaminated and where soap may not be available.  The case-468 
control survey did not ask questions about whether respondents used treated water for 469 
handwashing, but 91% who were asked about treatment methods, did not mention any 470 
method for treating household water.  Moreover, it was observed [5] that most households 471 
lacked any handwashing soap, and only three respondents had handwashing materials close 472 
to their main latrine facility.  It is very possible that many respondents said that they washed 473 
hands, when in fact they merely rinsed their hands.  Self-report is prone to another bias; 474 
socially approved behaviours are usually self-reported more frequently than observed [12-475 
14].  Bias in favour of approved behaviours could explain our apparent finding that regularly 476 
sharing food was protective.  Moreover, the interview asked about current practice not 477 
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those at the time of the outbreak; it is certainly plausible that people who have had typhoid 478 
would be more rigorous with handwashing practices after the outbreak, so the question 479 
could not elicit accurate information about exposure at the time of outbreak.  Inefficacy in 480 
handwashing technique is an unexplored risk factor.  In this resource scarce setting, it seems 481 
likely that hand-drying materials are also limited; inadequate hand drying can leave 482 
pathogens on the hands, too [14-16].  That so many respondents said they had soap but 483 
then could not display used soap when asked, supports the suggestion of bias for answers 484 
about handwashing behaviours. Consequently, given the potential biases in how the hand-485 
washing questions were answered, we conclude that the association between reported 486 
handwashing and risk of typhoid acquisition cannot be taken as indicative of a real risk of 487 
disease in people who do (properly) wash their hands. 488 
As for occupation of head of household, labourer with a regular work contract had 489 
the lowest quantifiable association with disease.  The next lowest risk group was casual 490 
labourers, adj. OR 2.12, 95%CI 1.41-3.17.  The finding may be confounded because military 491 
men fell into this occupational group with regular contracts.  No further information was 492 
available about the working environment for individuals with regular contracts. Possible 493 
explanations are that this category (about one third of respondents) tended to indicate 494 
households with more financial security due to regular work, or where the head of 495 
household, because of long-term regular dirty work, had prior exposure and thus acquired 496 
immunity to multiple Salmonella species and serovars [17-20].   497 
Limitations: This study was undertaken 13-18 months after the end of the 2011 498 
outbreak.  Assuming that responses to questions asked in early 2013 can truly describe 499 
behavioural practices in late 2011-early 2012 outbreak may be suspect.  The questionnaire 500 
did not ask about individual hygiene behaviour and practices during the outbreak to avoid 501 
other types of recall bias.  Local staff translated the questionnaire from French to other 502 
languages as required during interviews; we did not monitor this process and it may have led 503 
to inconsistencies in how questions were asked or answered; in the Kikwit area, French and 504 
the Kituba language predominate but there are many regional languages and dialects 505 
spoken plus interviewees could have come from anywhere in the DRC, which has over 200 506 
recognised languages.  We did not use serology to confirm that controls were negative or to 507 
confirm cases.    This means likely misclassification of some controls, which will have biased 508 
the odds ratios downwards in Table 3; this means our evidence for implicating water and 509 
sanitation in the spread of TF is understated.  Ecological analysis was limited to only one 510 
type of geography (health areas) and only in parts of the city, and only some spatial variables 511 
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(ones we could get data for).  Water quality could have changed between 2011 and 2013.  512 
We measured ThermoTolerant Coliforms about 16 months after the outbreak to gauge 513 
ongoing contamination of city water supplies, rather than PCR amplification that specifically 514 
looked for S. Typhi during the actual outbreak weeks.  Heavy rainfall can cause latrine 515 
overflows in Kikwit and could affect local supplies, changing preferred water sources; 516 
however, the outbreak, survey and water quality testing all took place in wet months with 517 
very similar levels of monthly rainfall (November-May period).  We assumed that general 518 
state of sanitation facilities (soap, latrines) did not change since the outbreak; however, we 519 
do have considerable anecdotal information that this assumption is valid.  Challenges in 520 
tracing cases were encountered due to the 13 months elapsed time since creation of the line 521 
list and survey start.  Some civilian cases may have been misidentified as camp residents, 522 
due to proximity of the camps to the general population, and vice versa. 523 
Our recommendations address both prevention and emergency responses, and also 524 
draw on observations and suggestions made by water sanitation engineers who visited 525 
Kikwit in December 2011 (S1 Report).  Our key recommendation to prevent or minimise 526 
future outbreaks in Kikwit of typhoid and similar diseases, is improvement to the water 527 
network.  Descriptive, spatial and case-control studies all identify the water network as 528 
instrumental in transmission of typhoid in 2011.  Surveys of water supplies in Kikwit in both 529 
July and November 2015 also found widespread unacceptable faecal contamination in all 530 
drinking water sources tested; 97% of the isolated bacteria in surface waters had human 531 
origin  [21].  This finding was strongly linked to outbreaks of waterborne diseases thought to 532 
affect up to 30% of the city’s population annually.  A full revamp of the city’s water system 533 
would clearly be very desirable.  Work is arguably most urgent in those areas fed by gravity 534 
supply, which are in the central area that also had the highest attack rates.  Improvements 535 
to the mains water network could include but should not be limited to: repairs to prevent 536 
inundation (including replacing pipes and reversing soil erosion), consistent chlorination of 537 
tap water, regular monitoring of the chlorination levels, rehabilitation of unprotected 538 
springs, and closing latrines located uphill and in relative proximity to frequented water 539 
sources or water mains pipes.   Hygienic harvesting of rainwater in public places could be 540 
implemented to make it easier to properly wash hands (S1 Report).  It would also be 541 
desirable to improve the overall sanitation and hygiene situation in Kikwit, especially within 542 
the places that were hotspots for TF transmission in 2011 (military camps) [6].  543 
Rehabilitating latrines, provision of ongoing resources to make handwashing safer and more 544 
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effective, to enable handwashing with soap and consistent household water treatment, 545 
could be beneficial.  546 
Recommendations as part of an immediate actionable response to an outbreak 547 
should include: creation of minimum perimeters from latrines to water sources and rapid 548 
drainage of runoff water around standpipes and hoses (S1 Report).  Rapid testing of water 549 
sources and rapid ascertainment of exposure risks during an outbreak would quickly 550 
facilitate understanding how such disease was spreading.  It is undesirable that the exposure 551 
data in this study were collected as late as 14 months after the outbreak.  Distribution of 552 
handwashing materials with health campaigns to promote full washing, for users of all water 553 
sources, would be desirable.  Emergency distribution of chlorine, either in tablets or via 554 
buckets, with usage instructions, to ensure more water treatment could be protective, 555 
although work needs to be done to make the taste of chlorinated water more acceptable to 556 
the local populace (S1 Report).  Distribution of hygiene kits may well be appropriate, 557 
especially to high risk groups [16].  Vaccine-based strategies for typhoid control are 558 
recommended for school-age children in endemic countries – in this context, a targeted 559 
vaccination in the camps might be effective emergency response or short-term prevention 560 
measure [22,23].   561 
 562 
Conclusions 563 
Following high early transmission in military camps near the city of Kikwit, use of 564 
contaminated mains water was consistently and reliably, strongly associated with typhoid 565 
fever acquisition.  A safer mains water network is the most valuable change that could 566 
prevent future disease.  Effective measures to better protect water supplies, include but are 567 
not limited to: relocation of intake points, more consistent chlorination, preventing 568 
inundation to the distribution network, and more convenient access to treated water.  Safe 569 
sources for the purposes of cooking and hand cleaning could reduce the size of TF and 570 
similar disease outbreaks in future.   571 
 572 
 573 
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